Economics Seminar (2020-15)
Topic: Reputation Building under Obervational Learning
Speaker: Harry Pei, Northwestern University
Time: Oct. 23,Friday.09:00a.m.- 10:30a.m. Beijing Time
Location: Microsoft Teams Online Conference Room
I study a social learning model in which a sequence of myopic players observe the actions oftheir predecessors in order to forecast the behavior of a strategic long-run player. A sequence of buyers interact with a patient seller, who is either a strategic type or a commitment type that mechanically plays the optimal commitment action. When each buyer observes all previous buyers’ actions and a bounded subset of the seller’s past actions, there exist equilibria in which the patient seller receives his minmax payoffff since the speed of consumer-learning goes to zero as the seller becomes patient. When each buyer observes all previous buyers’ actions and an unboundedly informative private signal about the seller’s current-period action, the speed of learning is bounded away from zero and a patient seller receives at least his optimal commitment payoffff in all equilibria. My results provide an explanation for instances of reputation failures and successful policy interventions in developing countries.
Harry PEI is an assistant professor of the department of Economics, Northwestern University. His research Interests: Game Theory, Monotone Methods, Political Economy, Law and Economics, Organizational Economics.
More information: https://sites.northwestern.edu/harrypei/
Your participation is welcomed.